Germany France Nuclear Sharing: Reality for Moscow & NATO
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Nuclear deterrence in Europe is being redrawn, as Germany France nuclear sharing is no longer just a myth. On July 17, 2026, Chancellor Friedrich Merz, along with President Emmanuel Macron, announced that German forces will take part in a French nuclear exercise this year. It is the first time in history that Berlin has agreed to such cooperation with Paris.
This is not Germany acquiring a bomb, and it is not France giving control of its arsenal. Instead, it is a signal to Washington, Moscow, and other NATO nations that Europe’s two military powers are developing a scenario with no US nuclear umbrella.
As a symbolic kickoff to the cooperation, French Rafale and German Eurofighter jets conducted a joint in-flight refueling drill because Rafales are certified to carry French nuclear weapons.
European Nuclear Deterrence Without the US: Is it Possible
The honest answer is: neither completely nor soon. The United Kingdom and France are two European nuclear powers, but their arsenals are smaller than those of the United States or Russia.
Although France contains approximately 370 warheads, they couldn’t substitute for the US B61 tactical bombs, which are currently deployed across five NATO states.
And Germany is one of five member states alongside Belgium, the Netherlands, Italy, and Turkey under NATO’s nuclear sharing program, which is linked to US nuclear assets deployed in Europe. What has changed is the political will to explore alternatives.
French President, in his March 2, 2026, speech, revealed that France would expand its arsenal and stop publicly disclosing the exact warhead count, framing this decision as an advanced deterrence measure that would give European partners a stake in French nuclear planning while retaining the decision to launch.
Germany, Poland, Belgium, Greece, Sweden, Denmark, Norway, the Netherlands, and the UK have expressed interest in the French initiative. But France’s nuclear command structure remains strictly national, and no equivalent to a NATO-like arrangement, under which host nations can deliver US warheads stored on their soil.
Analysts have flagged structural differences between France’s initiative and NATO nuclear sharing, raising serious questions about whether Paris can reassure allies accustomed to American operational integration.
For example, the format of a joint Franco-German nuclear exercise could allow German Air Force crews to participate in the planning and rehearsal phase of a simulated nuclear strike.
These exercises could also train German forces for joint air defense and crisis communication, but without authority to launch or make operational decisions.
In other words, a European deterrent without the US is a conceivable long-term project. Still, it exists mostly as consultation mechanisms, joint exercises, and political declarations rather than an alternative to the US umbrella.
Can Germany Legally Have Nuclear Weapons? The 1990 Treaty
Germany under legal constraint has no nukes. When East and West Germany reunified, the Final Settlement (the Treaty) with Respect to Germany, commonly known as the Two Plus Four Treaty, was signed in Moscow on September 12, 1990, by both German states along with the US, UK, France, and the Soviet Union.
The united Germany is bound to Article 3, under which Bonn and East Berlin could not manufacture, possess, or control nuclear, biological, and chemical weapons. This same clause is clearly tied to Germany’s obligations under the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) 1968, which was ratified in 1974.
Therefore, the French-German framework announced in March 2026 is carefully written. The joint statement from the two governments stressed that the new nuclear steering group complements rather than replaces NATO’s nuclear-sharing arrangements.
France and Germany have obligations under the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons.
However, Russia claimed that Germany’s 1990 sovereignty was conditional on permanent nuclear abstinence, forcing Moscow to legally contest German rearmament if Berlin planned to cross that red line.
Meanwhile, Analysts described this as a distortion because the Allied powers permanently terminated their reserve rights over Germany in the same 1990 settlement, so there is no legal mechanism by which Russia itself, a signatory, could use a German treaty violation to reassert authority over German territory.
Germany cannot lawfully build its own independent nuclear weapons without renegotiating a treaty and having a go-ahead from all five signatories, including Russia.
US Election Impact on NATO Nuclear Umbrella
Doubts over the American umbrella are currently not hypothetical. Since resuming his office, President Trump has repeatedly lambasted NATO burden-sharing.
In 2026, the US reduced its troops in Europe, including a withdrawal of 5,000 troops from Germany, in response to Chancellor Merz’s unfavorable remarks about the US strikes on Iran. They also recalled roughly 700 airborne troops from Germany, Romania, and Poland.
These withdrawals are not isolated military decisions. They are the most visible European consequence of the great-power economic competition between the US and its allies, in which Trump is systematically repricing the cost of American security guarantees to force a realignment of burden-sharing.
Defense Secretary Pete Hegseth’s Brussels speech on June 18, 2026, stated that strategic realities prevent the United States from focusing primarily on Europe’s security, reinforcing the perception in European capitals that Washington’s commitment is being actively renegotiated rather than merely rhetorically questioned.
Section 1249 of the 2026 National Defense Authorization Act restricts the Pentagon from cutting European troop levels below 76,000 for more than 45 days without certifying that the move serves US national security, consulting NATO allies, and briefing Congress.
However, this section only limits the number of withdrawals, not prevents them, serving as a backdrop against which the Franco-German nuclear dialogue should be read.
Merz has stressed there is no financial burden on Germany and that NATO’s nuclear-sharing program, to which Germany remains committed, continues alongside it. But the timing is not coincidental: European officials openly link the acceleration of Franco-German and Franco-British nuclear coordination to growing European defense self-reliance amid concerns about the future of US security commitments to the continent. The possibility of further withdrawal depends on the US elections.
France Political Instability Nuclear Deterrence
France’s own domestic politics is possibly the single biggest variable, as Macron cannot run again in the 2027 presidential election due to term limits.
The far-right French political party Rassemblement National (National Rally), led by Marine Le Pen and Jordan Bardella, currently polls as a strong contender for 2027. Bardella has openly rejected any geographic distribution of French nuclear forces outside French territory or dilution of sovereign control over the arsenal.
If the Rassemblement National wins in 2027, the most likely outcome is a rollback of the new and more Europeanized ‘cooperation’.
What This Germany France Nuclear Sharing Means For Moscow And NATO
For the Kremlin, Germany France nuclear sharing is a strategic complication. It signals that even under sustained American pressure to reduce troop levels, Europe’s core is moving toward deeper nuclear coordination.
The same European reluctance to act unilaterally that kept its trade bazooka unfired against Washington and Beijing is now being overcome in the security domain, driven by the same American unpredictability that Brussels has so far failed to answer economically.
Germany, the most nuclear-averse NATO power, is now willing to train its forces alongside French nuclear-capable aircraft publicly.
For NATO, the arrangement is being carefully framed as preservative rather than competitive with the nuclear-sharing program. A treaty-bound Germany cannot become a nuclear power itself. France’s arsenal, even after expansion, will remain a fraction of American or Russian stockpiles.
But the entire architecture rests on the leaders’ political survival. These frameworks would need to prove themselves in a genuine crisis if the Rassemblement National wins the 2027 elections.
Read more analysis in our Great Power Economics section.
